We develop a model of insider trading where agents have private information either about liquidation value or about supply and behave strategically to maximize their proÞts. The supply informed trader plays a dual role in market making and in information revelation. This trader not only reveals a part of the information he owns, but he also induces the other traders to reveal more of their private information. The presence of different types of information decreases market liquidity and induces non-monotonicity of the market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Replacing the noise introduced by liquidity traders with a random supply also allows us to study the effect the shocks on different components of supply have on prices and quantities. JEL ClassiÞcation numbers: D82, G12, G14.
Introduction
Agents engaged in trading activities might have access to different sources of information: information about fundamentals or information about supply. The existence of different types of information might reduce the inefficiencies that appear when agents are trading on private information about fundamentals. One of the reasons these inefficiencies occur is the fact that market makers respond to the existence of traders with private information by reducing the liquidity of the market. However, it is the private information itself which generates these inefficiencies and not necessarily the market mechanism. In this paper we analyze the process through which different types of information are transmitted to prices and how this affects market performance. We develop a model of insider trading in the context of an imperfectly competitive market where agents have private information either about liquidation value or about supply (different types of information that may inßuence the security prices at any point in time). In an imperfect competitive equilibrium prices are less informative than in a competitive rational expactations equilibrium. This is due mainly to the fact that a strategic trader exploits his informational advantage taking into account the effect the quantity he chooses is expected to have on both the price and the other informed traders' strategy. This effect is even more important when in the market there exist two types of information. As a result, we study how strategic trading on two types of information affects market liquidity, informational efficiency of prices and other market indicators in this new setup.
We use the framework developed by Kyle (1985 Kyle ( , 1989 ) which have become a standard for analyzing strategic noisy rational expectations markets. Kyle's (1985) model explains how a risk neutral informed trader exploits his informational advantage by behaving strategical and shows that the smoothing behaviour of the trader leads to prices that have constant volatility as the time periods become shorter to approach a continuous auction. An important generalization of the Kyle's model is to allow for multiple informed traders. Since the monopolist trader makes positive proÞts it follows that other trader might be willing to acquire information. Foster and Wiswanathan (1993) and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) explore this restriction of a single informed trader and point out the contrast between the case of a monopolist and the one of multiple traders. Thus, Foster and Wiswanathan (1993) extend Kyle's model to many traders and a larger class of distributions but obtain that Kyle's result that the informed trader can make positive proÞts does not hold anymore. On the other hand, Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) conclude that competition between informed traders leads to fully revelation of information. Kyle (1989) , to which our work is closely related, proposes an imperfect competition model in which there are noise traders, price informed traders and uninformed traders. He shows that a strategic trader acts as he trades against a residual supply curve. This implies lower quantities by comparison with the competitive rational expectations equilibrium and, consequently, in equilibrium prices reveal less information than in the competitive case. As it will be emphasized in this paper, in the case we have different types of information the dual role of prices to aggregate information and clear the market is even more important.
In the Kyle-type models an important assumption is the presence of noise. As it was already explained by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , noise is needed in the model to prevent prices to be fully revealing. They show that in a model in which agents are price takers and prices are fully revealed no agent will be willing to acquire costly information. To overcome this difficulty several ways to introduce noise were used: adding noise traders, considering uncertainty which has a dimension greater than that of price, or assuming that the aggregate endowment is imperfectly observed. We use this last approach by assuming a random supply. The presence of shocks in supply has a signiÞcant price impact. A supply shock leads to a change in prices and this determines the investors to revise their expectations. However, if the supply shock is observable by the supply informed traders, these traders make use of their informational advantage and therefore, are willing to adjust their demand. Consequently, we assume that there exists a supply informed trader who receives a signal about supply.
This approach was used before by Gennotte and Leland (1990) who consider a model were speculators posses private and diverse information. 1 They consider price takers 1 A similar assumption is that market makers have some information about the uninformed order ßow and it can be found in Admati and Pßeiderer (1991) and Madhavan (1992) . Palomino (2001) considers also a setup where the informed agents have information both about the liquidation value speculators who gather information either about prices or about supply and show that these informational differences can cause Þnancial markets to be relatively illiquid. Our model builds on the assumption of Gennotte and Leland (1990) about the existence of a random supply and informed supply speculator but we consider an imperfect competition setup with both price informed and supply informed agents where the agents submit limit orders. In general dealers observe order ßow and collect information from multiple sources. Therefore, we can think of the supply informed agent as being a dealer who can observe the order ßow. As pointed out by Brown and Zhang (1997) , despite of the fact that dealers may be better informed than other traders, in a competitive market they cannot earn rents on the information on the order ßow. This is due to the fact that price informed agents use their informational advantage to make gains on the expense of dealers. However, we will see that in our setup of an imperfect competitive market dealers can aggregate the information from trading and use it to earn speculative proÞts. Thus, the dealers can learn about the liquidation value of the asset from the orders placed by the price informed agents. The information revelation is increased signiÞcantly in our setup since the agents are placing limit orders and therefore, they condition their demands on prices and infer in this way a part of others' information. We assume here that there is only one supply informed trader.
Made for simplicity, the assumption is in line with the result obtained by Ellis et al. (2001) . They show that in general, one dealer tends to dominate the trading on a stock (executing a little more than half of the day's volume). They also answer the question who is the dominant dealer. Depending on the time passed from the offer day, the dominant dealer might be the underwriter, a wholesaler or a generic market maker.
In the rational expectations paradigm traders understand that prices reveal the information they have when they choose the quantities to be traded. The link between information and prices via trades provides an explicit mechanism for information transmission between traders. The existence of private information means that a trader may have incentives to act strategically in order to maximize his proÞts. Therefore, given his private information, a trader maximizes his conditional expected proÞts taking into account the effect of his trading on prices and taking as given the strategies other and the quantity traded by one of the noise traders.
traders use to chose their demand schedules. As in the imperfect competition model of Kyle (1989) we assume further that all the speculators choose strategically the amounts they trade. Therefore, the supply informed speculator will also chose his demand taking into account the effect of his trading on prices and revealing a part of information about the shock in supply to the other market participants. As a result, in our model both the information about the value of the asset or about supply is revealed through the quantities to be traded.
We are interested to understand the effects of different types of information on market liquidity, informativeness of prices, price volatility, and the ability of informed traders to exploit their private information. Our goal is to see how market liquidity and price efficiency are inßuenced by strategic interaction between agents with different types of private information. Allowing the supply informed agent to behave strategically, has an important role in the market-making and in information revelation. Indeed, he decreases the market depth and increases the amount of information revealed in prices but, unlike in the perfect competitive case, he also makes positive proÞts. Our model suggests that the presence of different types of information in the market decreases market liquidity. The result is in line with the one of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) that more information in the market leads to an increase in the bidask spread (i.e. a decrease in the market liquidity). The result should be situated in between the one of Kyle (1985 Kyle ( , 1989 and the subsequent literature which shows that increasing the number of informed traders increases market liquidity, and the one of Subrahmanyam (1991) which shows the opposite. Thus, Subrahmanyam (1991) also obtains that market liquidity can be decreased by increasing the number of informed traders in the case traders are risk averse. In our model we obtain that the presence of the supply informed agent and therefore, of a different type of information in the market, leads to a decrease in market liquidity. Still, if we are increasing the number of price informed traders we will still obtain the increase the market liquidity obtained in Kyle (1985 Kyle ( , 1989 ).
We performed comparative statics results for market liquidity measured as market depth and we conclude that if the information received by the supply informed agent is very precise or the one of the price informed agents is very poor the market liquidity is low. Most important, the presence of a supply informed agent in the market induces non-monotonicity of the market depth and other market performance indicators. Finally, we study how changes in supply affect the equilibrium price. We will consider two cases: a change in supply known to all investors or a change known only to the supply informed investors. We obtain that price informed agents absorb a higher fraction of the known shock, while the supply informed agent absorbs always half of the unknown shock.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
We establish the information structure and deÞne the imperfect competitive rational equilibrium expectations. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. We Þnd an unique linear imperfect competitive rational expectations price function together with agents' demand functions in equilibrium. Section 4 proceeds with the calculation of some market indicators: volatility of prices, informativeness of prices and expected proÞts.
Section 5 contains the characterization the equilibrium in the case there is no supply informed trader and then Section 6 compares the market indicators of this economy with the one of the economy with a supply informed agent. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the results and gives some directions for further research. All the proofs appear in the appendix.
The Model
The framework is similar to the one in Kyle (1989) . However, we assume risk neutrality, absence of uniformed traders and random supply with an observable component for one trader -the supply informed trader. As already pointed out by Kyle (1989) , the assumption of existence of uninformed traders does not change the analysis, but their presence leads to an increase in market depth. In what it follows we make the following assumptions:
A.1 There is a single security in the market that trades at market clearing price e p and yields an exogenous liquidation value e v which has a normal distribution with mean v and variance σ A.2 There are N price informed traders, indexed n = 1, ..., N and a supply informed trader. The price informed trader n observes a private signal e i n = e v + e e n . We assume that e n is distributed N(0, σ 2 e ) for all n = 1, ..., N. We suppose that for any j 6 = n e e j and e e n are uncorrelated and moreover, they are uncorrelated with all the other random variables in the model. The supply informed trader observes a private signal S which is normal distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2 S > 0.
A. 3 The random supply that keeps the traders from perfectly inferring the aggregate information from prices is modelled in a similar manner to the one in Gennotte and Leland (1990). The net supply e m consists of a Þxed amount m and a random supply e S distributed N (0, σ 2 S ) . This liquidity shock e S is observed only by the supply informed trader.
A.4 Agents are risk neutral and behave strategically taking into account the effect of their trading on prices.
As in Kyle (1989) , the n th price informed trader has a strategy X n which is a mapping from R 2 (the cartesian product of the set of asset prices and the set of his signals) to R (the set of shares he desires to trade), X n (·, ·) : R 2 −→ R. After observing his signal i n , each price informed trader submits a demand schedule (or generalized limit order) X n ³ ·, e i n´, which depends upon his signal. Similarly, the supply informed trader has a strategy Y which is a mapping from R 2 (the cartesian product of the set of asset prices and the set of his signals) to R (the set of shares he wants to trade),
After observing the signal S, the supply informed trader chooses a demand schedule Y (·, S), which depends upon that signal. Notice that since m is known by everyone, this implies that the supply informed agent actually knows e m.
Given a market clearing price p, the quantities traded by price informed traders and supply informed trader can be written x n = X n (p, i n ), n = 1, ..., N and y = Y (p, S). In the above notations a tilde distinguishes a random variable from its realization. Thus,
x n denotes a particular realization of e x n . The assumption that the price informed and the supply informed agents submit limit orders for execution against existing limit orders submitted by the other market participants turns out to be very important (for a detailed discussion see Kyle (1989) ). In this context both the price informed and the supply informed agents provide liquidity and therefore, have a market making role in the market.
The price of the asset is set such that the market clears. The traders submit their demand schedules to an auctioneer who aggregates all the schedules submitted, calculates the market clearing price and allocates quantities to satisfy traders' demand.
Thus, the market clearing price e p should satisfy with probability one
To emphasize the dependence of the market-clearing price on the strategies of the traders we write
where X is the vector of strategies of price informed traders deÞned by
and Y is the strategy of the supply informed trader.
The traders are risk neutral and maximize expected proÞts. The proÞts of the price informed trader n and supply informed trader are, respectively, given by
With these notations, following Kyle (1989) we can proceed to deÞne a rational expectations equilibrium in our setup.
Definition 1 An imperfectly competitive rational expectations equilibrium is deÞned as a vector (X, Y, p), where X is a vector of strategies of the price informed agents
Y is a strategy of the supply informed agent and p is the equilibrium price such that the following conditions hold:
1. For all n = 1, ..., N and for any alternative strategy vector X 0 differing from X only in the n th component X n , the strategy X yields a higher proÞt than X 0 :
2. For any alternative strategy Y 0 the strategy Y yields a higher proÞt than Y 0 :
3. The price p = e p(X, Y ) clears the market (with probability one) i.e.
This deÞnes a Nash equilibrium in demand functions. Given their private information, traders maximize their conditional expected proÞts taking into account the effect of their trading on prices and taking as given the strategies other traders use to choose their demand schedules.
We look for a symmetric linear Bayesian Nash Equilibrium as in Kyle (1989) , that is, an equilibrium where the strategies X n and Y are linear functions:
X n ³ e p, e i n´= α P I + β P I e i n − γ P I e p, for any n = 1, ..., N and
where
With this assumption we can infer from the market clearing condition that the equilibrium price is given by
Characterization of the Equilibrium
We describe in the following proposition the equations that characterize the symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium has linear trading rules and linear pricing rule and is shown to be unique among all linear, symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibria.
As in most Kyle type models, the linearities are not ex-ante imposed in the agents strategy sets: as long as the informed traders use a linear trading strategy, the market maker will use a linear pricing rule and vice versa.
there exists a unique linear symmetric equilibrium deÞned as:
with α P I , β P I , γ P I , α SI , β SI , γ SI given by
is similar to the usual condition N > 2 in all Kyletype models. It tells us that we need competition in order to alleviate the asymmetric information problem. In our model the asymmetric information problem is even more important than in Kyle (1985 Kyle ( , 1989 because we have two different types of information that aggregates in prices. Since the supply informed agent observes the supply he acts as an informational monopolist trading such that he always extracts some rents.
However, the price informed agents are competing against him trying to reduce his informational advantage. The worse the quality of the signal of the price informed traders relative to the liquidation value, the more difficult is for them to compete against the supply informed. However, since they are asymmetrically informed, increasing their number it will make it more difficult for the supply informed to infer their information.
Consequently, in the case we have a supply informed agent we need more competition in order to reduce his monopoly power and trade aggressiveness and therefore, for the equilibrium to exists.
We would like to understand the effects of different types of information on market liquidity, informativeness of prices, price volatility, and the ability of informed traders to exploit their private information. We are Þrst concerned with market liquidity because it has been recognized as an important determinant of market behaviour.
There are different measures of market liquidity used in the literature: market depth, bid-ask spread and price movement after trade. We will use as a measure of liquidity the market depth (as deÞned by Kyle (1989) ), which represents the volume of trading needed to move prices one unit. While solving the above system we have obtained that
.
On the other hand, from the price equation (3) we can see that an increase (decrease)
in the supply by γ induces the price to fall (rise) by one dollar. The trading volume needed to move the price by one unit (market depth) was used by Kyle (1985) as a measure of market liquidity. We use the same measure as Kyle and consequently, γ is our measure of the market liquidity. As we can see the market depth γ has two components that have opposite effect. The Þrst component Nγ P I is attributed to the price informed agents trading. This is the amount with which they contribute to a change in the price when each of them trades an additional unit. The more priced informed agents are in the market, the higher the liquidity. Similarly, we have that γ SI is the change in price due to an additional unit of trading by the supply informed agent. The two components have opposite sign and we have here a trade-off: whenever the price informed agents are increasing the market liquidity the supply informed agent will try to reduce it.
The fact that γ SI is negative is a very important result in our model and it is a consequence of the mechanism of information transmission through prices. In general, with asymmetric information prices play a dual role of information aggregation and market clearing. The role of information aggregation played by prices is even more important in our economy with asymmetric and different information. We have thus, two important channels through which we have ßow of information (information about the liquidation value from the price informed traders towards the supply informed trader and information about supply from the supply informed trader towards the price informed traders). The supply informed agent puts a positive weight on price (γ SI < 0) because when he sees an increase in price he associates it with good news about the liquidation value (he knows the supply, so the price increase cannot be due to a decrease in supply). This mechanism of information transmission actually triggers a decrease in market liquidity. For 1 additional unit demanded by a price informed agent the price goes up. The supply informed agent associates it with good news about the liquidation value and increases his demand leading to a even higher increase in price.
Since the same volume will increase the price more we can conclude that we have a decrease in the market liquidity. As we have seen before, the market depth has two components γ = Nγ
The Þrst component is the contribution to the market depth of trades executed by price informed agents while the second one is the contribution to the market depth of trades executed by the supply informed agent. The two components have opposite effect and thus, the Þnal result on market depth due to the market making activity of the agents depends on which of the two components dominates. The Þrst result in the Corollary is similar to the previous ones in the literature (Kyle (1985) We do obtain in our model that the behaviour of the market depth with respect to the variance of the supply and the variance of the error of the signal is very similar to the previous cases in the literature, but overall the quantitative result it is very different. We obtain that the presence of a supply informed decreases the market liquidity. Our result should be interpreted as it follows: if we have different types of information in the market, the liquidity is reduced. The result should be situated in between the one of Kyle (1985 Kyle ( , 1989 and the subsequent literature which show that increasing the number of informed traders increases market liquidity, and the one of Subrahmanyam (1991) which shows the opposite. Thus, Subrahmanyam (1991) also obtains that market liquidity can be decreased by increasing the number of informed traders in the case the market maker is risk averse. In our model we obtain that the presence of the supply informed agent and therefore, of a different type of information, leads to a decrease in market liquidity. This result captures the intuition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , that more information in the market decreases the market liquidity.
In their model, they use as a measure of liquidity the bid-ask spread (low liquidity being equivalent to high bid-ask spread), and an increase in the number of informed agents increases the bid-ask spread. Still, if we are increasing the number of price informed traders we will have again the increase the market liquidity obtained in Kyle (1985 Kyle ( , 1989 . Despite of the fact that the decrease in the market liquidity is due to the different type of information, our result is very similar to the one of Subrahmanyam (1991). The similitude is caused by the fact that the supply informed agent is risk neutral, but he behaves strategically. Moreover, since he submits limit orders he has a market-making role, the role played by him in the economy being thus similar to the one played by the risk-averse market maker in Subrahmanyam's (1991) model.
Once we have determined the equilibrium demand strategies we can determine also the market clearing price.
Corollary 2 The equilibrium price is given by
From this corollary we can see that the unconditional expectation of the equilibrium price is
and it depends on the expected supply m. If m = 0, the price is an unbiased estimator of v, but it is biased if m 6 = 0. We also can see that as expected the higher the supply (the expected supply m, or the realization of the liquidity shock e S observed by the supply informed agent), the lower the price and the higher the signals received by the price informed agents the higher the price.
Notice also that a change in the different components of the supply has a different impact on price. A change in the known part of supply m is absorbed by the agents through the quantity demanded in a proportion of N − 1 N (we have seen while calculating the strategies that α = Nα
is the function we had obtained in the Appendix) and only 1 N is reßected in price.
Similarly, a shock in the component of supply known to supply informed agent e S is absorbed half by this agent through his demand and partly is reßected in price. As I have already explained, the supply informed trader has a monopolist position and extracts rents that amount, as we saw above, to half of the unknown component of supply.
Market Indicators
In what it follows we study the implications the existence of a supply informed agent have on the market performance. We compute some market indicators: volatility of prices, informativeness of prices and expected proÞts of different market participants and characterize them with respect to the variance of the liquidation value of the asset.
Corollary 3
The price volatility, measured as the variance of price, is
Similar to the case when there exists no supply informed agent we have that the volatility of prices does not depend on the noise in supply. If the noise in supply increases all the agents -both the price informed and the supply informed -trade more aggressively making better use of their particular informational advantage. We can also see that price volatility may decrease or increase with the variance of the liquidation value σ 2 v . We obtain thus that the price volatility has a U shape as respect to σ v shrinks and we recover the result from the case without supply informed trader that the higher the variance of the liquidation value of the asset, the higher the volatility of prices. As a result, in a market where there are enough price informed agents, there is more information revelation and the volatility of prices increases.
Next, we would like to Þnd which is the amount of private information -both about the liquidation value and supply -that is revealed through prices. We deÞne thus, the information content of prices as the difference between the prior variance of the payoff and the variance conditional on prices. Using the normality assumptions we obtain the expression presented in the following Corollary:
Corollary 4 The information content of prices is
Similarly to the previous Corollary, we obtain here also that price efficiency or the information content of prices does not depend on the variance of supply shock e S. Moreover, we obtain that informativenes of prices is increasing the variance of the liquidation value σ 2 v and decreasing in the variance σ 2 e . These results tells us that when it is difficult to predict the liquidation value or when the signals of price informed agents are poor, the prices play a very important role in information revelation. While these results, are qualitatively similar to the case without supply informed agent, as we will see later they are quantitatively different.
Let us turn to the expected volume traded by the price informed agent and supply informed agent, respectively.
Corollary 5
The expected volume traded by a price informed agent is
The expected volume traded by the supply informed trader is We compute next the unconditional proÞts for all agents.
Corollary 6
The unconditional expected proÞt of the n th price informed agent is
The unconditional proÞt of the supply informed agent is
As we expected, allowing the supply informed agent to behave strategically allows him to make positive proÞts by comparison with the case of perfect competition when he is making zero proÞts. Notice also that since the price informed traders absorb always 1 2N of the shock S, it is actually the different information that they receive the one that makes them have different proÞts. We want to see also which is the impact of changes in supply on the equilibrium price and the quantity demanded by the different agents. Similar to Gennotte and Leland (1990) we study the two following cases: a supply increase known to all agents m, and a supply increase known only to supply informed agent e S.
Corollary 7 A positive shock in supply known to all the agents m leads to an increase in the demand of both type of agents, a decrease in the equilibrium price and therefore, to an increase in the expected proÞts of both type of agents.
As expected, an increase in the supply known to all agents determines them to adjust their demands according with the existent supply, and it also leads to a decrease of the equilibrium price. We obtain here that the price informed agents are always absorbing a greater proportion of the shock in supply m.
Corollary 8 A positive shock in the component of supply e S, known to the supply informed agent decreases the equilibrium price and increases the quantities demanded by both price informed and supply informed agents.
As expected, in the case of a positive shock in the supply e S, the supply informed agent increases his demand making use of the private information he has. Moreover, the increase in supply (due to a positive shock in e S ) absorbed by the supply informed agent is N times higher than the increase of supply absorbed by any price informed
agents. An interesting result is that the supply informed agent is always absorbing half of the unobservable shock in supply, the other half being absorbed by the price informed agents.
Equilibrium without Supply Informed Agent
In order to see which are the effects of different types of information on market liquidity, informativeness of prices, price volatility, and the ability of informed traders to exploit their private information we need to provide a benchmark for making comparison with the equilibrium characterized in the previous section. A Þrst step will be to see how the presence in the market of a supply informed agent affects all these market structure indicators. For that we characterize Þrst, in a similar manner, the equilibrium without a supply informed agent. Notice that this model is a version of Kyle's (1989) model with the difference that we do not have uniformed agents and we replace the noise agents by a random supply.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique linear symmetric equilibrium deÞned as:
p, e i n´= α I + β I e i n − γ I e p, for any n = 1, ..., N where α I , β I , γ I are given by
Similarly to the case with supply informed agent we proceed with the calculations of the equilibrium price and equilibrium quantities traded by the price informed agent.
Corollary 9
The equilibrium price when there is no supply informed agent is
Notice that the price is here also an unbiased estimator of e v if and only if m = 0.
Next we compute the same market indicators we have computed for the economy with a supply informed agent. An interesting remark to be made is that neither the volatility of prices nor the efficiency of prices depend on the shocks in supply.
Corollary 10
The market indicators for an economy without a supply informed agent are the following:
1) The price volatility, measured as the variance of price, is
2) The information content of prices is
3) The expected volume traded by a price informed agent is
4) The expected proÞt of a price informed agent is
Comparison of Market Indicators
We are comparing now the market indicators in the case there exists a supply informed agent with the case there is no supply informed agent. We study Þrst the effect the presence of the supply informed agent brings about on the market depth. We have that
the market depth in the case we have a supply informed agent and
the market depth in the case we do not have any supply informed agent. The market depth is smaller in the case we have a supply informed agent in the market γ < γ P I .
This result is quite intuitive if we think that the supply informed agent plays a dual role in the market. First, he reveals himself a part of his information in the process of trading. Second, by having the information about supply he determines the price informed agents to reveal more of the information they own.
An interesting result that we obtain is that when there exists a supply informed trader in the market the price informed traders are trading more aggressively on their private information ¡ β P I > β I ¢ but they devote less to the market making activity
The inside information allows the price informed agents to make gains on the expense of the market makers. However, when there exists a supply informed agent who has the ability to disentangle the order ßow originated by price informed agents from a shock in supply, the advantage of the price informed agent diminishes and therefore, his market making gains. A part of the gains that the price informed agents where making from market maker activity are now made by the supply informed agent. As we have seen already the price informed agents still put a higher weight on the maker making activity than the supply informed agent does. This tells us that a dealer although he might have information about supply faces strong competition in market making from the other traders. Moreover, we have that the effect of trading more aggressively on their information dominates the effect of decreasing the market maker activity and this leads to a higher trading volume by price informed agents.
Proposition 3
The presence of the supply informed agent in the market leads to higher volatility of prices, higher informativeness of prices and higher volume of trading by price informed agents.
The results that the volatility and informativeness of prices increase in the case there exists a supply informed agent is due to two factors. First, the existence in the market of the information about supply forces informed agents to reveal more of their information. But also, the shock in supply affects more the price than in the case there is no supply informed agent because the price informed agents get some information about supply from the action of the supply informed trader.
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a model of insider trading where the agents might have information either about prices or about supply. This information is aggregated and partially revealed through the equilibrium price, so the agents will end up with more information than they initially posses. Our goal is twofold. First we try to understand how the presence in the market of a supply informed agent and the interaction with the price informed agents can change the behaviour of the price informed agents and the structure of the market. Then, we see how the shocks in different components of supply can alter the market structure, the price formation and the behaviour of the agents, and therefore the impact of this shocks in the equilibrium outcome.
We consider an imperfectly competitive rational expectations setup and characterize the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in demand schedules. We characterize in closed form the symmetric linear equilibrium for the case the errors of the signals of the price informed agents are noncorrelated. Allowing the supply informed agent to behave strategically, he makes positive proÞts (unlike in the perfect competitive case) and increases the amount of information revealed in prices. We see that he has a dual role in inducing information transmission in the market: Þrst because he owns superior information which he reveals in the trading process and second, because he urges the price informed agent to reveal more of their information. Hower, the most important consequence of his presence in the market is that he decreases market liquidity ( this outcome being brought about the strategic behavior and the mechanism of information transmission through prices).
We have also studied how the market performance is affected in our model by A Appendix Lemma A.1 In a symmetric linear equilibrium Nγ P I + γ SI 6 = 0.
Proof. We look for a symmetric linear equilibrium. Therefore, we use the linear strategies deÞned in (2) and we can write the market clearing condition (1) as it follows:
We deÞne γ ≡ Nγ P I + γ SI and α ≡ Nα P I + α SI . Using these deÞnitions, the market clearing condition can be written as
We want to prove that γ 6 = 0. Let us suppose that γ = 0. Then, the above condition
Since e i n , n = 1, ..., N are independent of e S, it results that β P I = 0. Plugging it in the above equation we obtain that
which cannot be satisÞed because α and m are real numbers and e S is a random variable.
We obtained therefore, a contradiction.
Lemma A.2 In a symmetric linear equilibrium the optimal demand for the price informed trader n and for the supply informed trader are, respectively,
y(e p, e S) = Nγ
with γ P I > 0, and ( N − 1)γ
Proof. Let us Þrst determine the optimal demand for the price informed traders. Price informed trader n considers the other players' strategies as given by (2) . As a result, he is facing the following residual demand:
and he solves the following maximization problem:
The Þrst order condition for this problem is
Using (9) we can write further (10) as
and from here we Þnd the optimal demand of price informed trader n :
The second order sufficient condition for this maximization problem is
Similarly, the supply informed trader takes as given the strategies of the price informed traders and in conformity with (2) . The residual demand faced by him is therefore p =
The supply informed trader solves the following maximization problem:
Using (11) we can write further (12) as E ³ e v¯e p, e S´− p − y Nγ P I = 0, and from here we Þnd the optimal demand of supply informed trader
Since N ≥ 1 it results γ P I > 0.
Lemma A.3 In a symmetric linear equilibrium for any n = 1, ..., N we have
Proof. We can rewrite the market clearing condition (6) as
From here it results that ³ e p, e i n´i s informationally equivalent to
Consequently, we have E ³ e v¯e p = p, e i n = i n´= E ³ e v¯f h n = h n , e i n = i n´. Applying the projection theorem for normally distributed random variables we obtain that
We compute cov
Then we calculate the variance matrix. We calculate Þrstly
In order to simplify the notation we deÞne q
v and consequently, we can write the variance matrix as
The determinant of the variance matrix is
and this is always higher than zero.
Since M 6 = 0, it exists the inverse of the variance matrix and it equals to
Once we have calculated cov
we can proceed and identify A and B. It results that
Since f h n ≡ (N − 1)
In addition, we assumed that E ³ e i n´= E (e v + e e n ) = v. Using the above values for expectations and the formula (13) for f h n the expression (14) can be written as
where A and B are given by (15) .
Lemma A. 4 In a symmetric linear equilibrium we have
Proof. We write again the market clearing condition (6) this time in order to Þnd a pair informationally equivalent to
We deÞne θ ≡ β
From here it results that ³ e θ, e S´is informationally equivalent to ³ e p, e S´. Consequently, E ³ e v¯e p = p, e S = S´= E ³ e v¯e θ = θ, e S = S´. Applying again the projection theorem for normally distributed random variables we obtain that
where e e n , Nβ P I e v + β
The variance matrix is nonsingular and its inverse is
and consequently,
¢¢ −1 and D = 0.
Since E ³ e i n´= v, and e θ ≡ Nβ P I e v + β P I N P n=1 e e n we have that E ³ e θ´= Nβ P I v. In addition, we assumed that E ³ e S´= 0. Using the above values for expectations, the fact that D = 0 and the formula (17) for e θ, the expression (14) can be written as
where C is given by formula (19) .
Lemma A.5 The coefficients α P I , β P I , γ P I , α SI , β SI , γ SI are the solution of the following system of equations:
Proof of Lemma A.5. In Lemma A.3 and Lemma A.4 for we have established the expressions for E ³ e v¯e p = p, e i n = i n´a nd E ³ e v¯e p = p, e S = S´. We will use them now to Þnd the expressions for the strategies for the price informed agents and for the supply informed agent.
First, since E ³ e v¯e p = p, e i n = i n´= E ³ e v¯f h n = h n , e i n = i n´w e plug (16) in (7) and we obtain that
We identify the coefficients in the deÞnition of the strategy of the price informed trader n (2) and we get the following equations:
Second, since E ³ e v¯e p = p, e S = S´= E ³ e v¯e θ = θ, e S = S´we plug (20) in (8) and we obtain in a similar manner
We identify the coefficients in the deÞnition of the strategy of the supply informed trader (2) and we get the following equations:
where C is given by (19) .
Putting together the equations (15), (21), (19) and (22) we obtain that α P I , β P I ,
SI are the solution of the above system of equations.
Proof of Proposition 1.
We leave apart the equations for α P I and α SI since these variables are not involved in the other equations. Then since by deÞnition γ = Nγ P I + γ SI we can write the equation
and from here to solve for β P I
Similarly, we have that
and we obtain from here that
By substituting γ P I given by (24) in (23) we can write further β P I only as a function of γ and A,
We obtain the coefficients for the supply informed agent in a similar way. We have that
and from here it results that
Finally, using the formula (24) we obtain that
By deÞnition γ = Nγ P I + γ SI . Then by replacing the formulas for γ P I and γ SI obtained before we obtain the following equation in A, C and γ :
In this equation we replace γ = 2β
and we obtain further
Using the same equation we can rewrite β SI given by (26) in a simpler way.
Next, we deÞne z
Using (25), (29) and the equation in the system that deÞnes C we can write
Further on we compute the expressions for A, B as function only of β P I and z. Thus
By replacing it in the equation (28) we obtain
Let us deÞne now as u ≡ ¡ β
Then it results that z = x 2 σ 2 S and the above equation can be written as
On the other hand, we have that
We can now use this formula for B to rewrite equation (30) as
Since σ 
But also, using the deÞnition of x we can write
Note that 1 − x cannot be 0 since
So we have two expressions for B and we equalize them obtaining the following equation in x :
. This last equation has two solutions x = 0 and x = (N + 1) (Nσ
First, if x = 0 then z = x 2 σ 2 S = 0 and it results β SI = 1.
and u = 0. But u = 0 implies β P I = 0 and from here A = γ = 0 and the second order condition is not satisÞed.
Second, we have that
Using this formula we can compute then
e > 0 we have u ≥ 0 and consequently, we have solution for β P I and it is equal to
Using the last equation in the system we can write also
Next, since
we can Þnd an expression for γ P I . Using the formulas for β SI (32) and C it results that
Similarly,
An important remark has to be made. The coefficient γ SI < 0, however the second order conditions are satisÞed since
We compute now the ratio γ
because we will make use of it later on.
The only coefficients left to compute are α P I and α SI . We have from the system that
We will Þrst compute t ≡ (α−m) and for that we use the deÞnition α = Nα P I +α SI .
Thus, we have
Solving for t ≡ (α − m) we obtain
Using that
we have that the denominator is
and the numerator is
As a result,
We proceed now with the computations of the coefficients α P I and α SI . As we have already seen
and replacing the formulas we have obtained for A, B and t we obtain that
Here we have deÞned δ by
Consequently, using the deÞnition of δ we can write the coefficients in the following way:
Proof of Corollary 1. While solving the above system we have obtained that
We study Þrst how market depth varies when the variance of liquidity shock e S varies.
We compute the derivative ∂γ ∂σ 
We study this function and we obtain that the equation
has only one positive solution equal to
. So, it results that the function f (σ
, k l (N)¸, and is increasing for σ Proof of Corollary 2. From the market clearing condition (6) we obtain that the equilibrium price is
We had obtained in the proof of Proposition 1 that
Using these formulas and the ones for β P I and β SI we can write that the equilibrium price equals to
Notice that since e i n = e v + e e n we can write Taking the expectations it results that E (e p) = v − 2Nσ Proof of Corollary 4. We compute now V ar (e v) − V ar ( e v| e p). Due to the normality assumptions we have that V ar (e v) − V ar (e v| e p) = (V ar (e p)) −1 (Cov (e v, e p)) 2 We calculate the covariance
Cov (e v, e p) = (Nσ Then, since x n is N (µ n , σ x n ) it results that the expected volume of trade
Similarly, the quantity demanded by the supply informed agent is a normal variable with mean µ y = (Nσ Using the formulas we have obtained for e p and f x n we can write further Let us compute now the unconditional expected proÞt of the supply informed trader.
Using the formulas we have obtained for e p and e y we can write further Π SI = E ³ g π SI´= E ((e v − e p) e y) . We can check and see that indeed the proÞts we have obtained sum up to this amount.
